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ABSTRACT
After the legislation of the Renewable Energy Law, China's government established a series of policies to
promote renewable energy source electricity (RES-e) from 2005-2012. The effectiveness of the policies
varies depending on different perspectives of different stakeholders. Explaining this phenomenon, this
research comprises interviews of industry experts, references to previous studies, case studies and data
exploration.
The renewable policies of China focused more on supply side than demand side. Indeed, China built up
its capacity in manufacture of renewable energy equipment and in generation of RES-e under its policies
over a short period of time. However, the lack of the involvement of consumer incentives hindered the
further growth of RES-e industry. The renewable policies indicate the institutional shortcomings of
China's government on designing economic growth policies.
This study concludes that policies are more effective to the sustainable development of an industry
when set on the demand side than on the supply side. China's government needs to shift its focus on
fast short-term growth of supply to long-term growth of local demand.
Thesis Supervisor: Yasheng Huang
Title: China Program Professor in International Management
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1 Background: history and growth
China has been one of the fastest growing economies in the past twenty years. In 2012, the GDP of
China reached $8.36 trillion. (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) The total energy consumption of
China also reached the equivalent of 3.62 billion tons of coal (National Bureau of Statistics of China),
surpassing that of US and becoming the largest energy consumer in the world. As a rising economy in
the world, China has become more and more serious about reducing carbon emission. A series of
government regulations and economic incentives have taken place in the past decade to promote
renewable energy. However, the consumption of non-hydro RES-e (mainly wind, solar and biomass
power) has not increased as fast as the installed capacity of RES-e generation. The objective of this
article is to study the effectiveness and influence of the renewable energy policy-set in China, analyze
the reaction and motivation of stakeholders in the RES-e industry under the policy-set, and predict the
future of RES-e consumption in China.
1.1 Phenomenon
In the year 2005, the National People's Congress (NPC) of China passed the Renewable Energy Law.
Subsequently, to fulfill the growth of renewable energy, a series of administrative measures,
instructions and development targets have been stipulated by different government departments,
including National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of
Science and Technology (MOST), etc. A combination of policies, such as renewable portfolio standard
(RPS), Feed-in Tariff (FIT), tendering and subsidies, has been implemented and tested within the
renewable energy industry in China. The influence of these policies is significant. For instance, the newly
installed capacity of wind power grew over 100% annually in four consecutive years, from 2006 to 2009.
However, although the installed capacity of non-hydro RES-e was 7.51% of total electricity capacity in
2012, the non-hydro electricity generation was only 2.30% of total electricity generation. There were
administrative limitations as well as technical limitations behind this phenomenon.
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At the same time, manufacture of wind turbine and solar PV panel also grew exponentially during this
period. Fast growth of the industry stimulated the economy and lowered cost. However, overproduction
also caused waste and anti-dumping accusations in the US and European market.
1.2 Growth of RES-e
In 2005, the portion of RES-e was still negligible among overall electricity volume. The installed capacity
of RES-e contributed 0.66% of overall installed generation capacity. At the same time, the electricity
generation of RES-e accounted for only 0.47% of overall electricity generation. Thermal power
dominated the electricity supply. Power plants, fueled by coal, gas and oil power, accounted for 75% of
overall generation capacity and 80.4% total electricity generation. The fast growth of RES-e only took
place after the legislation of the Renewable Energy Law.
1.2.1 Capacity
As shown in Table 1, from 2005 to 2012, the installed capacity of non-hydropower RES-e had grown
quickly. The newly installed capacity had maintained a compound annual growth rate of 61.3% from
2005 to 2012. The cumulative installed capacity reached 86GW and was 7.51% of the total installed
capacity.
Within the non-hydropower RES-e, wind power played an important role in China and contributed
around 90% of the total installed RES-e capacity. From 2006 to 2009, installed capacity of wind power
doubled every year.
The growth of solar happened relatively later. The technology focus was mainly on photovoltaic panel.
The exponential growth of solar power took place in 2009. In 2011, the newly installed solar power
capacity almost tripled the installed capacity in 2010. And the exponential growth rate continues.
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Table 1 Installed capacity from 2005 to 2012 by technology, unit: MW, source: GlobalData, author's calculation
Technology 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Biomass 2,021 2,086 2,443 2,743 2,880 3,087 3,308 3,556
Geothermal 28 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Hydro 117,388 128,570 145,260 171,500 196,800 213,400 230,510 245,513
Nuclear 6,587 7,572 8,463 8,438 8,438 10,065 11,816 13,816
Solar PV 68 80 100 145 373 893 3,500 7,000
Solar Thermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Coal 362,436 453,520 519,452 559,777 604,898 653,250 706,670 740,350
Gas 9,702 14,141 17,965 21,277 25,080 29,354 32,650 35,375
Oil 11,993 16,161 18,658 20,265 22,072 24,026 26,140 25,399
Wind 1,267 2,603 5,770 12,002 25,805 44,733 62,364 75,564
Total 511,489 624,757 718,134 796,172 886,371 978,832 1,076,983 1,146,610
Subtotal RES 3,384 4,793 8,337 14,914 29,083 48,737 69,197 86,158
Subtotal Thermal 384,130 483,822 556,074 601,320 652,050 706,630 765,460 801,124
% of RES 0.66% 0.77% 1.16% 1.87% 3.28% 4.98% 6.43% 7.51%
% of Fossil 75.10% 77.44% 77.43% 75.53% 73.56% 72.19% 71.07% 69.87%
1.2.2 Generation
As shown in Table 2, electricity generated from RES-e grew at a CAGR of 38.7% from 2005 to 2012. The
growth rate was much higher than the CAGR of total electricity generated, which was 10.7% during the
same period. However, compared with the growth rate of insta-Iled RES-e capacity, the growth rate of
the electricity generated was much smaller.
Table 2 Electricity generation from 2005 to 2012 by technology, unit: GWh, source: GlobalData, author's calculation
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A performance measurement of power plant is the Equivalent Full-Load Hours (EFLH). If the total
electricity generated of a given plant in a given year is divided by the installed capacity of that plant, the
result is the EFLH of that plant that year.
EFLH = Total electricity generated / Installed capacity (1)
The intermittency of RES-e and the limitation of the power grid both limit the EFLH of RES-e. The
intermittency of RES-e is the technical factor. The performance of wind or solar power plant depends on
weather condition. Without strong wind or sunshine, wind or solar plant cannot produce at full capacity.
Second, the generation of RES-e is also limited by the capacity and preference of the power grid
company. Chapter 5 will discuss about it in detail.
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Geothermal 96 96 178 178 180 180 180 180
Hydro 393,047 431,428 429,957 522,423 548,955 686,307 662,600 778,200
Nuclear 50,331 51,800 59,290 65,324 65,713 70,962 87,400 94,983
Solar PV 67 79 99 143 368 881 3,451 6,961
SolarThermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
Coal 1,946,5 2,297,4 2,647,1 2,710,4 2,914,2 3,325,5 3,776,2 3,918,0
45 31 41 70 63 63 11 13
Gas 12,320 25,757 40,284 45,697 61,456 70,130 79,633 83,577
Oil 59,136 50,912 33,275 23,134 16,482 18,808 21,356 41,287
Wind 1,356 2,785 6,175 12,843 27,617 50,100 70,600 90,420
Total 2,473,0 2,870,7 3,228,6 3,394,0 3,649,5 4,238,4 4,718,0 5,031,5
58 77 83 01 15 51 66 38
Subtotal RES 11,680 13,449 18,736 26,954 42,646 66,682 90,866 115,478
Subtotal 2,018,0 2,374,1 2,720,7 2,779,3 2,992,2 3,414,5 3,877,2 4,042,8
Thermal 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 77
% of RES 0.47% 0.47% 0.58% 0.79% 1.17% 1.57% 1.93% 2.30%
% of Fossil 81.60% 82.70% 84.27% 81.89% 81.99% 80.56% 82.18% 80.35%
1.3 Stakeholders in this industry
The electricity sector is highly regulated in China. Although institutional reform has taken place during
the past ten years, the transmission, distribution and retail of the power sector is still monopolized by
the state power grid company (SPGC). The generation is separated from the grid company and still
consists mostly of state owned enterprises (SOEs). The national development and reform commission
(NDRC), sets the electricity price. Further, the state electricity regulatory commission (SERC), the
regulator, did not act as influential as it supposed to be.
Under a centralized government structure, the development of renewable energy is mainly driven by
the central government, especially the NDRC, which plays the role of key regulator. In the industry
pipeline, the stakeholders include manufacturers, developers or generators, power grid company and
power consumers. At the same time, local governments also have an important role within their
jurisdictions respectively. This paper will take different perspectives of stakeholders to evaluate the
effectiveness of the policy-set.
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2 Regulatory framework
In 2005, the renewable energy law established the regulatory framework of renewable energy in China.
As shown in Appendix 1, Chinese government established a series of policies and regulations in the
renewable energy sector to plan and support the development of renewable energy.
From 2005 to 2012, the government implemented a combination of tendering, renewable portfolio
standard and feed-in tariffs to find the most reasonable and practical RES-e price. At the same time,
several government departments provided subsidies and special funds to support the development of
the renewable energy industry. However, the organizational structure of the regulators and the
different interests of the central government and local governments created barriers during the process.
2.1 Electricity price
There are two main policy models to determine the electricity price of RES-e in the world. One is the
feed-in tariff (FIT) and the other is the renewable portfolio standard (RPS). Regulators in China tested
both of the two models in the RES-e industry.
FIT
Within the FIT mechanism, the regulator sets a fixed price for RES-e and guarantees the price for a
period long enough to remunerate the investment of developers with a reasonable profit. At the same
time, power grid companies have the obligation to purchase RES-e. RES-e also has priority to access the
power grid.
As the price of RES-e is fixed and the profit of renewable energy investment is protected, investors have
fewer risks under the FIT policy model. The FIT model also requires a powerful regulator to implement
the system. So countries characterized with a more regulated and centralized power sector use the FIT
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model more. For example, in Europe, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain take FIT as their RES-e pricing
model.
The payment process of RES-e in China was special. Rather than paying the premium of RES-e directly
during purchase, the power grid company only paid the conventional electricity price on generation, and
collected a renewable energy surcharge on electricity consumption. After the collection, the power grid
company paid the premium to generators annually. The renewable energy surcharge was only CNY
0.001/kWh from 2006, raised to CNY 0.004/kWh in 2009 and raised again to CNY 0.008/kWh in 2011.
The shortcomings of this model are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
RPS
The RPS policy model is a quota system. The regulator allocates a fixed quantity or share of RES-e to the
electricity suppliers or generators. RES-e generators will get tradable certificates for RES-e production,
and the price of such certificates will be determined by market demand.
Under an RPS policy model, either the price of RES-e or the certified emission reduction credits (CERs)
fluctuates more. Investors could gain a bigger profit during high demand and also could lose money
during low demand. A feature of RPS model is that it requires more market mechanism, and
consequently countries with a more liberalized power sector usually implement the RPS model. The UK,
Sweden and Italy are examples of countries implementing the RPS model.
In 2005, China implemented a modified RPS model accompanied by a tendering process to stimulate
investment in RES-e. The RPS model in China was different from that in Europe. Rather than requiring an
RES-e generation quota, the Chinese RPS required an RES-e installed capacity quota. This was also
canceled during the modification of the renewable energy law in 2009, as FIT took its place.
13
This mechanism motivated the developers, because of their stated-owned nature. The bidding
electricity prices were as low as CNY 0.43/kWh during the first period. (Xu, Yifan) The main reason
behind this phenomenon was that the SOEs did not have as much economic pressure to make money on
RES-e as they had administrative pressure to meet the required RES-e portfolio. However, this process
gave the regulator an opportunity to create a market and understand the cost of RES-e. Manufacturers,
developers and power grid companies all got experience during this process.
As the total capacity of RES-e increased, especially wind power, the profitability of RES-e became more
important for developers. NDRC, as the regulator, also understood the cost structure of RES-e better
from the concession tendering over time and wanted to create a sustainable market. The regulatory
framework gradually turned into a FIT model.
In 2009, "NDRC announced FITs for four categories of onshore wind power projects. The tariffs ranged
from CNY.51/kWh, CNY.54/kWh, CNY0.58/kWh and CNY0.61/kWh with the best wind resource
regions getting the lowest tariff." (All FITs quoted from GlobalData) These FITs provided economic
incentive to developers to keep invest in wind power plant. At the same time, FITs of solar and biomass
were also established as below:
"Solar projects approved before July 1, 2011 and completed before December 31, 2011 will receive
$0.18/kWh (CNY1.15/kWh), excluding solar thermal.
"Solar projects approved after July 1, 2011 but not completed by December 31, 2011 will receive
$0.16/kWh (CNY1/kWh)."
"In 2010, the National Development and Reform Commission announced a new national FIT for biomass
power of CNYO.75/kWh, equivalent to $0.11/kWh." (GlobalData)
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The evolution from an RPS mechanism to a FIT mechanism helped the regulator to get a reasonable
price for RES-e and continuously provide incentives for developers to invest in RES-e.
2.2 Tax relief, Subsidies and funds
Tax relief, subsidies and special funds (TSFs) were also contributing to the growth of the RES-e sector in
China. The TSFs were mostly designed to support local manufacturers and developers of renewable
energy projects.
Taxes
Tax policies supporting renewable energy projects involved two taxes: corporate income tax (CIT) and
value-added tax (VAT).
CIT was exempted or deducted in several ways. First, qualified advanced and new technology
enterprises enjoyed a reduced CIT rate of 15%, while the normal CIT rate in China is 25%. Second, CDM
funds and enterprises operating CDM projects could enjoy CIT exemption for "carbon emissions
reductions (CER) proceeds that are shared by the government" (KPMG). The exemption was 100% in the
first three years and 50% in the following three years. Third, enterprises also enjoyed CIT deductions
from investments in renewable energy equipment and R&D. Such deduction could also be amortized
over the next five years after the investment happened.
VAT was refunded to companies in a more direct way. Fifty percent of VAT was refunded on the sale of
wind power to the generators, and a "100 percent refund of VAT [was] paid on the sale of biodiesel oil
generated by the utilization of abandoned-animal fat and vegetable oil". (KPMG)
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Subsidies and funds
Various subsidies and funds were provided to manufacturers and generators from different
departments of the government. Manufacturers were given subsidies to promote advanced and new
technology projects. From 2008-2010, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) provided subsidies of CNY 600/kW
for qualified wind turbine manufacturers for their 50 sets of machines (Xu, Yifan).
2.3 Administrative policies
Unlike economic incentives, administrative policies directly mandated stakeholders to behave according
to the growth targets of renewable energy set by the regulators.
From 2003-2010, NDRC took measures to protect and promote local production of wind turbines. During
that period, all the wind power concession projects required that at least 50-70% of the components
should be produced in China. (Silva, and Klagge)
In 2010, industry experts reported to the state council that the wind turbine industry was facing
overcapacity. The government filed documents to limit the incremental capacity of wind turbine
production. On the developers' side, all wind farms over 50MW were required to get approval by NDRC.
Meanwhile, the Renewable Energy Law required the power grid companies to purchase all the RES-e
and share the incremental cost among their electricity customers.
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3 Manufacture
The manufacture of renewable energy equipment scaled up very fast in the past several years. In terms
of production capacity, China is leading the world in wind turbine and solar photovoltaic production.
Both economic incentives and administrative policies have been leveraged to motivate manufacturers in
this sector. At the same time, market drivers were different between wind turbine and solar PV
manufacturers in China. Wind turbine manufacturers were driven mainly by the local wind power
market, while solar PV manufacturers were mostly focusing on the international solar power market.
The growth of the manufacturing sector has lowered the cost of renewable energy and increased its
competitiveness. However, both wind and solar manufacturers in China now face issues of
overproduction. The international market has also made antidumping accusations, which threatens the
sustainability of renewable energy manufacturing in China, especially in the solar PV industry.
3.1 Related policies
Supply side
Tax relief: Qualified manufacturers of wind turbine and solar PV could enjoy the VAT and CIT tax relief
mentioned in Chapter 2; Subsidies and funds: Leading manufacturers of wind turbine could get subsidies
from MOF. Several special funds were set aside for advanced and new technology research in both wind
power and solar power manufacturing.
Demand side
Renewable portfolio standard: The RPS required the power developers with more than 5GW-installed
capacity to have a portion of their electricity supply from RES-e. So the big developers had to expand
their RES-e to meet the standard. Concession project: The government organized several rounds of
concession projects, first in wind power and then also in solar power, to encourage RES-e.
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3.2 Growth of renewable energy manufacture
3.2.1 Wind
Wind power manufacturing developed in three stages. In the first stage, wind turbine manufacturing
was motivated by government policies. In 2005 and 2006, the demand for wind turbines grew rapidly
after the implementation of renewable policies. All the state-owned developers were looking for wind
turbines at that time. The first group of local manufacturers, mainly having an SOE background, devoted
themselves to this industry. Shortly after their purchase of technology from European industry leaders,
local manufacturers ramped up production quickly and took advantage of the 70% localization provision.
In the second stage, attracted by the economic incentives and driven by local government,
manufacturers kept increasing their production capacity and establishing branches in regions with
abundant wind resources. In 2010, there were more than 80 wind turbine manufacturers in China. The
leading manufacturers claimed to have the core technology and used localized key components to drive
down cost. During this period, the price of on-shore wind turbines dropped from CNY 6000/kW to less
than CNY 4000/kW.
In the third stage, under the accusation of international market, government cancelled almost all the
subsidies and the 70% localization provision in wind turbine industry. However, the low cost
competitiveness of local manufacturers was already established in the local market. The Chinese
manufacturers also started to seek oversea market to utilize their production capacity, although quality
issues limited their capability in the international market. Meanwhile, after the second period of intense
competition, competitors in this market could hardly make profit. The top two manufacturers, Sinovel
and Goldwind, both faced shrinking profit and tense cash flow.
The influences of government policies on wind turbine manufacturers were significant. The
manufacturing industry of wind turbine is close to a competitive market. With all the economic
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incentives, tax relief, subsidies and funds, new entrants kept entering this market and drove the profit to
zero. At the same time, under the protecting 70%-localization provision, local manufacturers took
advantage of the policy and avoided competition from international competitors on technology and
quality. It is obvious that polices in wind power manufacture effectively expanded the production of
wind turbine as well as drove down the cost. The low cost of equipment contributed to the fast growth
of installed capacity. However, the problem of over production also created waste. Especially, driven by
local governments, lots of manufacturers built localized branches that were less than economically
effective.
3.2.2 Solar
Solar was not considered as the first choice of renewable energy source by China's government. First,
the cost of solar power has always been higher than that of wind power. Second, the energy intensity of
solar is lower than wind. Solar power requires a huge area to build up capacity. (Gao) Before 2005, solar
power was mainly used to electrify rural areas with no access to the power grid. (Liu, Wang, Zhang, and
Xue) After the establishment of Renewable Energy Law, Solar power was still not economically
competitive with wind power in China. However, benefiting from economic encouragement from the
government, the solar power market grew fast in Europe, especially in Germany, Italy and France.
Different from wind turbine manufacturers, solar PV manufacturers in China were mainly driven by
private capital.
In 2005, Suntech, the biggest solar PV manufacturer in China, was privatized and listed in NYSE as the
first private owned Chinese company listed in NYSE in history. According to Forbes magazine, the
founder of Suntech became one of the richest people in China with "a personal net worth of USD 2.9
billion and ranked 39 6th among the world's billionaires in 2008." (He) Local government also supported
Suntech, which was the excellent economic growth provider and tax contributor.
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Observing the success of Suntech, new entrants entered into this market at a fantastic speed. According
to Xinhua News Agency, "more than 100 cities in China had build solar PV industrial park. In Zhejiang
province along, there were more than 205 companies doing solar power business." At the same time,
markets leaders also kept expanding their business. In 2011, Suntech was the biggest manufacture of
solar panel in the world. Starting from 2007, China has been the biggest solar PV manufacturing country
in the world for six consecutive years. The production in China took 40% of the market share around the
world in 2009. (Liu, Wang, Zhang, and Xue)
However, as solar power was less economically competitive than wind power and more difficult to build
up huge capacity, domestic market for solar panel was limited. More than 90% of the Chinese
production was exported to international market, mainly to Europe. The negative influence of the
international market after the financial crisis in 2008 was magnified by the antidumping and
countervailing accusation from the US in 2011. The department of commerce (DOC) determined in 2012
that "Chinese producers/exporters have sold solar cells in the United States at dumping margins ranging
from 18.32% to 249.96%." (Department of Commerce, United States) The antidumping and
countervailing investigation from EU is still ongoing, and consequently the solar PV industry in China has
fallen into winter after that.
Aware of the risk of an industrial failure, central government started a series of project to increase
domestic market. The process to promote solar power was similar to that of wind power, as the
government was quite familiar with the process already. In 2009, government organized the tendering
of the pilot solar project in Gansu, and got a relatively lower price at CNY 1.09/kW. (Liu, Wang, Zhang,
and Xue) At the same time, the price of the main components, solar panel, kept decreasing. In 2011,
NDRC set the FIT for solar power at CNY 1/kW. The government also started to promote distributed
solar power generation, which was a more common form than large-scale power plant in Germany.
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The policies from the government seemed to come a bit late. In 2011, the solar power market in China
took 8% of the world market (Xu, Honghua), while the production in China took more than 50%. In early
2013, Suntech was forced into Chinese bankruptcy proceeding after defaulted on a USD 541 million US
bond payment.
3.3 Effectiveness analysis
The economic incentives and the administrative policies were more than effective in the manufacture
sector of wind power and solar power. There were similarities and differences between wind and solar,
in terms of policy effectiveness.
First, the two manufacturing industries had different market focus. Due to government policy support,
the wind power development started earlier and grew faster. China has become the world's No. 1 both
in wind turbine production and wind power installed capacity. As most of the production was for
domestic market, wind power manufacturers enjoyed a more stable and less risky market.
Second, influenced by government policy, the capital sources of wind and solar manufacture were also
different. To shown support for government policy, more SOEs would invest in wind turbine
manufacture. At the same time, solar PV manufacturers were mostly driven by the high profit margin
from oversea markets in 2005 and funded more by private investors.
However, both oversupply and trade frictions took place in wind and solar manufacture. Oversupply was
reasonable during the rapid growth period of a new industry. Although both wind and solar in China
faced trade friction from international market, the two industries were affected differently due to
different market position.
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Figure 1 Chinese wind turbine price, Source: lEA, Notes: yellow circles represent turbines with smaller capacity and red
circles represent those are 2.5MW or larger
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Another important similarity was that fierce price competition both took place in these two markets.
This was also reasonable according to economic principle, which tells us that only zero economic profit
could stop more market entrants. Price competition greatly lowered the cost of RES-e and supported
the further expansion of renewable energy. As showed in figure 1 & 2, the price of wind turbine and
solar PV both dropped a lot in the time period discussed. However, low profit margin also limited the
investment in R&D activities and the focus on product quality, which in the long run would harm the
industry, especially in the competitive global market.
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Figure 2 Chinese PV module price, source: Reconsidering the Economics of Photovoltaic Power
In conclusion, the manufacture side of RES-e was a competitive market influenced by government policy.
Wind turbine manufacture benefited from local protection, tax relief and subsidies, and also enjoyed a
fast growing local market under government policy. Although economic incentives on the manufacture
side also benefited solar PV manufacturer, the lack of domestic demand finally harmed the industry
more. The different policy support on the demand side determined the different scenario of wind and
solar manufacture in China.
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4 Generation
The development on the generation side has been growing fast, especially on installed capacity. From a
mechanism of tendering with a renewable power standard (RPS) to that of feed-in tariff, policy makers
successfully motivate power developers to produce RES-e.
Most of the power plants in China are owned by state owned enterprises (SOEs). Due to a liberalized
coal market and a regulator-set electricity price, most of the power plants claim losing money under the
current given electricity price. However, under the feed-in tariff policy, RES-e developers are promised
to recover their investment with a reasonable profit by investing in wind, solar and biomass.
Government also implements taxation measures to increase profitability of RES-e plant. At the same
time, the clean development mechanism (CDM) could also provide income for generators.
Meanwhile, the administrative policies of RPS also help motivate developers. According to the
Renewable Energy Law enacted in 2006, generators were required to generate a percentage of non-
hydropower RES-e in their energy source portfolio. The percentage required is 3% by 2010 and 8% by
2020. The character of SOEs makes the administrative policies especially effective and drives the
developers to invest in RES-e. Further more, regulators also required the state power grid company
(SPGC) purchase all RES-e and facilitate grid connection.
4.1 Related policies
Supply side
FITs made the investment in RES-e profitable. Profitability was the effective economic incentive on the
supply side. CDM also made profitability more possible for developers by trading certified emission
reduction credits (CERs). However, additionality is the basic requirement for CDM project scrutiny.
Projects, which could make money with out CERs, could not pass CDM assessment. The price of CERs
also depended on market demand. "The price hit a high of $26 in July 2008, and then fell to around $10
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in February 2009 in response". (Gillenwater, and Seres) The concession tendering was one of the most
effective measures from the NDRC to directly promote RES-e. Up to the 2012, five rounds of wind power
bundled tendering were organized with a total 2.6GW capacity of wind power projects. (Xu, Yifan)
Demand side
Required purchase of the RES-e was stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law, which required the power
grid company to purchase all the generated RES-e. Required purchase theoretically protects supply by
creating an infinite demand. However, the mandatory purchase provision was also modified to
guaranteed purchase in the modification of renewable energy law in 2009, as the generation of RES-e in
lots of places overweight the absorption capability of the power grid. Government also urged the power
grid company to provide grid connection support to RES-e, as most of the RES-e plants were build in
remote regions where grid connection was weak.
4.2 Growth of RES-e generation
4.2.1 Wind power
As discussed in Chapter 1, wind power was the main RES-e source in China during the period from 2005-
2012. In 2011 China has become the biggest wind power market for both newly installed capacity and
total installed capacity. Three reasons, energy intensity, economic competitiveness and profitability,
contributed to the fast growth of wind power generation in China. (Gao)
Frist, he energy intensity of wind power is relatively high comparing with solar and the other renewable
energy. The government could plan several 10GW class wind power projects in wind source affluent
regions. The developers, mainly SOEs, were also willing to build up RES-e capacity in short time to meet
the RPS requirement. Not surprisingly, wind power grew fast because of its nature.
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Meanwhile, the price of wind power electricity has always been much lower than solar power or
biomass. In 2010, the FITs for wind, solar and biomass are respectively CNY 0.51-0.61/kWh, CNY 1/kWh
and CNY 0.75/kWh. (GlobalData)
Third, the profitability of wind plants changed in two stages. In the first stage, wind power electricity
price was determined by tendering result. In this stage, most of the bidding price could be as low as CNY
0.4365/kWh. The projects were hardly profitable under these prices. However, benefiting from CDM
support, those projects could still somehow sustain and break even. At the same time, the competition
from the wind turbine manufacturers took place fast and fiercely. Wind turbine took 60% of the total
investment in wind farms. And the price of wind turbine decreased by more than 30% from 2006 to
2009. The developers benefited from the price competition of wind turbine manufacturers, the
advanced techniques in construction and the taxes relief from government policies. In the second stage,
after the establishment of the FITs wind farms were in general profitable without generation limitation
from the grid.
However, the power grid company had limited capacity to fully absorb wind power, as it kept growing.
At the same time, technology maturity and economic feasibility also challenged the further
development of off-shore wind power in China. The problems from the power grid companies became
more serious as the capacity of wind power increased. First, grid connection could not be promised in
some remote areas. Areas with abundant wind resource usually were not electricity load center. Since
the local consumption of electricity was low, the power grid there was also built at low capacity and
limited distribution capability. Second, in some areas with abundant wind resource and limited grid
capacity, the installed capacity of wind farms had surpassed the demand of the grid. During windy
seasons when all the wind farms could operate on full capacity, the grid had to limit their production to
protect its security. Third, wind power was not stable due to its nature of intermittency. However, the
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power sector requires the supply of electricity to match the demand. Backup electricity plant, usually
gas power plant or hydropower pant, has to be ready to operate during low-wind or non-wind periods.
As its not economically feasible to build back up electricity plant only for wind power, the power grid
companies had to limit the production of RES-e due to electricity security consideration. The issues and
solutions of the power grid company would be discussed in Chapter 5 in detail.
Wind power developers had also started offshore wind development under the support of NDRC. The
pilot project in Shanghai Donghai Bridge has been operating since 2010. And the first round offshore
concession projects tendering also took place in 2011, getting electricity prices from CNY 0.6235/kWh to
0.737 /kWh. The maturity of manufacturers and construction companies under such low price and huge
scale is still questionable.
4.2.2 Solar
The development of solar power was in general later than wind power. Due to the nature of solar
power, some special policies and solar schemes were implemented to support both large-scale solar
power plant and distributed solar power utilization.
In 2009, a series of events about solar power took place. "The first large-scale grid-connected solar PV
power project was commissioned." (Liu, Wang, Zhang, and Xue) The project is located in GanSu province
with a capacity of 10MW. However, different from wind power, distributed solar power is a more
feasible form to utilize solar energy. In 2009, government initiated the Gloden Sun Program to support
both grid connected and off-grid PV power generation, and the BIPV Subsidy Program to support
distributed building integrated PV projects.
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The real exponential growth of solar power took place in 2011. At the end 2011, total installed capacity
of solar power reached 3.5GW with a newly installed capacity of 2.7GW in that year. (Xu, Yifan) The
lowered cost of solar components realized the large-scale development of solar power. Government
planed large-scale solar power plant mainly drove the fast growth. Lowered cost, tax relief and subsidies
also made the investment in solar power more attractive.
However, the nature of intermittency also limited the performance of solar power. Distributed solar
power utilization seems to be a solution to mitigate the impact of intermittency of solar. It has been
proved to be a successful mode in Germany. Up to now, although the government intends to promote
distributed solar power, power developers lack experience and incentive to invest in the small-scale
generation. The realization of distributed solar power relies on the involvement of electricity consumers.
Chapter 6 would discuss the involvement of consumers in developing distributed solar power in detail.
4.3 Effectiveness
The effectiveness of policies on RES-e generation was significant. First, most of the power developers in
China are SOEs. For SOEs, administrative targets are as important or even more important than
economic incentives. The initiative of RES-e was closer to a planned economy in the generation side. The
NDRC has developed and become experienced in a process from concession projects tendering, to feed-
in tariffs. This process was especially effective in wind power sector. Second, the policies of tax relief and
subsidies to the generators increased the profitability of the power plants directly. After a short period
of low profit or loss, the FITs promised the generators a better internal return rate (IRR) than
conventional power plant. Third, the cost of renewable energy equipment kept driven down by
intensive competition. A lowered cost also resulted in a better profitability to the generators.
There are two important barriers limiting the further development of RES-e generation. One comes from
the limitation of the power grid; the other is caused by insufficient renewable energy fund. The
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bottleneck of connection and absorption from the power grid could not be solved by current policies.
The implications of current policies to the power grid will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
The insufficiency of renewable energy fund is caused by a fixed RES-e surcharge and a fast growing RES-
e generation. Although the RES-e surcharge was raised from CNY 0.001/kWh to 0.008/kWh, there is still
a gap of CNY 10-20 billion to pay the premium of RES-e. The gap could be as big as 50% of the total RES-
e premium. (Xu, Yifan) Although generators are mostly profitable on book, the delayed payment
intensifies their cash flow, which influences their payment to the equipment suppliers.
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5 Transmission, distribution and retail
In China, the transmission, distribution and retail of the power sector is actually monopolized by the
state power grid company (SPGC), which has become a colossal conglomerate in power sector.
The whole body of regulation and policies does not provide much incentive to SPGC. The FIT mechanism
gives RES-e a premium to conventional electricity. Regulator requires SPGC to purchase all the RES-e.
Although the shared cost mechanism namely allows SPGC to share the cost among all its consumers. The
electricity-selling price is actually set by the NDRC. The SPGC is a price taker and does not have
economic incentive to purchase RES-e.
Meanwhile, the intermittency of wind and solar makes RES-e technically unwelcomed by the grid
company. As the planning of power supply is based on the power demand in a given region, the power
supply system need to prepare backup capacity to backup RES-e when the production of wind power
and solar power decreases due to weather conditions.
5.1 Related policies
Supply side
Under the FIT mechanism, the power grid was required to purchase all the RES-e and provide
connection support.
Demand side
On the demand side, the FIT mechanism was combined with a shared cost mechanism. All the users
should share the premium cost of RES-e. In practice, government let the power grid company collect a
surcharge of CNY 0.001/kWh. The surcharge was tax-free (GlabalData) and was raised to CNY 0.004/kWh
in 2009 and to CNY 0.008/kWh in 2011 due to the fast increase of RES-e. (IEA, Energy Research Institute
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of China) The surcharge was put into renewable energy fund to subsidize further development of
renewable energy.
5.2 Reaction of the grid
Other than administrative requirement, there was no real incentive for the grid to promote RES-e. As
the entire surcharge would be used as renewable energy fund, the power grid company could get
nothing from the purchase and sales of RES-e. Another economic shortcoming is the technical issue. The
compounded full operation hours (CFOHs) of wind is 2000 hours per year and around 1500 hours for
solar PV. That of conventional power plant is around 5000 hours. The grid company generated profits by
charging a transmission fee. At the micro level, a local power grid company didn't have incentive to
support more RES-e, because if more installed capacity was taken by RES-e, total electricity generation
would decrease and less transmission income could be generated.
Second, to provide connection support to the RES-e generation, the power grid companies also need to
leave capacity on the grid for RES-e generators that were usually much smaller than conventional
generators. These RES-e plants made the design and construction of power grid more complex. (Gao)
Providing connection support to RES-e might even increase the cost of grid.
At the same time, distributed RES-e or off-grid RES-e took potential market from the power grid
company. The more RES-e generate by distributed generator, such as building integrated PV or private
solar panel, the less those consumers would consume electricity from the grid. Although the
government required the power grid company to provide connection to those distributed RES-e
generation, the monopoly status of the grid company in China determined that it had no motivation to
really promote RES-e. That is also the same for stand-alone or off-grid RES-e generation.
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Figure 3 The layout of SGCC and CSPG, source: Mr. Fan Bi's blog, note: the power grid of the grey area in southern China is
controlled by CSPG, the rest area is controlled by SGCC
The behavior of the grid company came from its monopoly market position. Previously, the entire power
sector was integrated in one institution in China, the ministry of electric power. After the State Grid
Corporation of China (SGCC) was established, government required the separation of generation from
the SGCC and established five big state owned power developer. However, all the rest parts of power
-sector, transmission, distribution and retail, were still monopolized by the SGCC and the China South
Power Grid (CSPG), which monopolize part of the southern region.
Although the electricity price is set by NDRC, the SGCC still generates huge among of profit from simply
purchase and sales of electricity. Some experts criticized that the efficiency of the power grid was very
low. (Xu, Yifan)
Intermittency was the biggest disadvantage of RES-e from wind and solar. Meanwhile, regions with
abundant wind and solar source are usually not electricity load center. SGCC has planned a remote
power transmission line of 750 kV, which is the highest level around the world, to solve the RES-e
32
transmission problem. However, some experts also worried that the high voltage line would be a too
costly project and might be used more by conventional electricity source. (Xu, Yifan)
5.3 Effectiveness
Because of the nature of monopoly, the grid company, SGCC, lacked the incentives to promote RES-e.
The government could only use administrative policy to require that the grid should connect to and
purchase all RES-e. If the vertical monopoly is broken and the distribution and retail of the power sector
could be liberalized, more market measures could be leveraged in promotion RES-e. The further
development of RES-e really needs support from the grid side. Remote transmission and smart grid
might be technical solutions for the grid. Market liberalization would provide the government more
choices to promote RES-e.
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6 Consumption
The consumption side of RES-e is not actually involved during the fast growth of renewable energy in
China. There were some demonstration projects of consumer involved RES-e development. First, the
greed electricity scheme in Shanghai tried to motivate users to consume RES-e at a premium price.
Second, some big developers integrated RES-e plant and electricity consuming factory and established
self-sustained micro grid mode. Third, under the new policy of distributed solar PV, some household
users also successfully connected private solar power generation to the power grid.
6.1 Shanghai green electricity scheme
Shanghai tried to implement a green electricity scheme to motivate voluntary purchase of RES-e. But the
scheme ended up with no continuous RES-e subscribers. There are both economic and institutional
barriers to improve, according to the analysis of the failure of the Shanghai case.
First, government needs to set up a mechanism to raise the awareness of RES-e in consumers, provide
economic incentives as well as notable honor to RES-e users to fully utilize the contribution on the
consumption side. Second, institutional reform or better organization is needed to utilize market
measures in promoting RES-e schemes.
Introduction
Green electricity scheme is a market-based instrument (MBI) to form a market of RES-e, generate
revenue from the premium sales and further develop RES-e based on the revenue. In 2005, Shanghai
introduced the first green electricity market in China. (Mah, and Hills)
The purpose of the green electricity scheme was to build a market based on the willingness to pay for
the RES-e at a premium price. Consumers were assumed to voluntarily purchase the RES-e. The theory
of this mechanism is to leverage the willingness to pay from the consumers, generate revenue and
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lighten the burden of government in supporting renewable energy development. At the same time, "the
concept of the green electricity market is also a form of institutional changes." (Mah, and Hills) Lots of
countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands and UK, had implemented this mechanism, although it's
not considered as the mainstream.
Shanghai is one of the most developed cities in China. As residents of the economic center in the
country, Shanghai citizens were also considered to have the higher awareness of environmental
protection and energy conservation. As the 2010 world Expo was approaching, shanghai government
also had the political incentive to realize its concept of "better city, better life".
Figure 4 Subscription Statistics of Shanghai Green Electricity Scheme, source: The Kadoorie Institute, HKU
2005Subscribers/
Year (by year end)
Number of Subscribers I N.A.
2006
22
2007
24
2008
24
2009
None
Subscription Volume N.A. 14.76 17.42 17.42 None
(million kWh)
Total Subscription N.A. 15.82 18.56 18.56 None
Volume: (1)+(2)
(million kWh)
However, the performance of the scheme was not satisfying. As showed in Figure 4, most of the original
subscribers were corporate users, mainly organized by the government. The involvement of household
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users was limited. At the end of the first subscription period, which was 2008, no more users continued
their subscription.
Several barriers limited the performance of this scheme. First, the awareness of consumers was not
focused or raised by the scheme. The scheme was not well known among normal citizens, so potential
demand from household consumers was not fully utilized.
Second, the scheme barely provided any incentives to subscribers. The initial plan was only to entitle
subscribers a "green leaf" label, which demonstrated their contribution to green electricity. However,
even this honorable incentive was not promoted much over media. In the later stage, government
provided economic incentives as tax relief on RES-e and consumption priority during electricity shortage.
The marketer, Shanghai municipal electric power company, failed to implement these measures.
Third, as the marketer, SMEPC lacked marketing experience. SMEPC is a branch company of SGCC, The
nature of monopoly determined that SMEPC could not be a good marketer and has no incentive to
promote the scheme effectively.
Last but not the least, Institutional inertia also slowed the decision making process of this scheme. As
mentioned in the second point, measures of tax relief and usage priority came out late. Low efficiency of
communications between different departments at the municipal government level delayed the
decision making process. (Mah, and Hills)
6.2 Micro grid demonstration
The energy-intensive industries have incentive to build self-supply power plants as the electricity cost
will be lower than purchasing from power grid. Several metallurgical factories located in wind abundant
areas build some wind plant to supply RES-e. This is a successful mode to promote renewable energy.
The energy-intensive industries should take bigger responsibility in reducing carbon emission. As lot of
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these factories have self-supply power plant, they could nicely absorb a reasonable capacity of RES-e
themselves. At the same time, the mode of self-supply avoids the barriers from the power grid company
and saves the cost of transmission and distribution.
6.3 Household generation
In 2012, NDRC issued official documents to promote distributed solar PV projects. In the forth quarter
2012, the SERC also issued documents to support distributed solar PV grid connection. As soon as the
document was released, a Beijing householder installed a small solar PV project on the roof of his house,
applied for power grid connection, and at the beginning of 2013, started generation and sales of RES-e
to power grid.
This was an inspiring demonstration project. It is the first time a private householder selling electricity to
power grid in this country. However, as the supportive policies had not been fully established, the
householder could only sell his RES-e at the grid-purchase price of conventional electricity, which was
CNY 0.4/kWh. Because of the low price, the project would take 18 years to break even. (Xi)
6.4 Effectiveness
The three cases of consumer involved RES-e promotion have shown the potential of RES-e on the
consumers' side. The Shanghai Green Electricity Scheme was a government driven RES-e consumption
promotion project, which ended up failed. The model of voluntarily purchase of RES-e seems not
working without associated policy support. However, distributed RES-e seems to be an effective model,
as the consumers themselves could be involved within the projects and share the benefits.
Opportunities and probabilities on the consumption of RES-e will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
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7 Role of local government
In China, central government is the policy maker while the local governments take the responsibility of
implementation. However, due to the variety between different regions, the effectiveness of policy is
different from place to place. The incentive for the local government should also be considered during
policymaking process.
For most of the local governments, the biggest interest of renewable energy industry is its contribution
to local economic growth and financial income. Local governments welcome RES-e while it could bring
incremental growth and income with a small cost. This phenomenon is more obvious in developing
areas as the contribution of renewable energy could take a big percentage to local growth and as the
land cost is relatively lower. In developed regions such as Shanghai, most of the motivation for RES-e is
from administration policy and willingness to mitigate environmental problems.
7.1 The influence of tax policy
Local governments always tend to prioritize their local interests over central government policy. Before
2009, local governments welcomed wind power plant more than after. The reason was in 2009, a tax
policy was set to support generators. The provision was that for the generators, the cost of wind turbine
is deductible in the VAT of electricity generation. Before this policy, local government could collect taxes
right after the construction of wind power plant. After that, local government could not get any taxes
from wind power plant for five to eight years. (Ministry of Finance, China) This policy was designed to
support RES-e generation, but somehow harmed the incentive of local governments.
After that policy, more and more local governments urged wind power developers introduce
manufacture into the region to support local economy in another way. As some of the key procedures
were controlled at the local level, developers could only try their best to satisfy the requirement of local
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government. Under such background, manufacturers built factories at a less than economic effective
level.
7.2 Effectiveness
The implications of a policy could be more than the government intension. Taking the variety of
different region into consideration, regulators at the central government level could not make over
simplified or generalized policies. In the case of VAT policy, the unpredicted effect to the local
government finally harmed the generators, the intended beneficiary of the policy.
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8 Difficulties and shortcomings of the policy-set
8.1 The focus on the supply and overlook on the demand
At the very beginning of the policy-set, the policymakers chose installed capacity rather than RES-e
consumption as the first criterion to evaluate the target of renewable energy development. Installed
capacity is the production capacity of RES-e, while RES-e consumption in the final use of it. The criterion
of installed capacity is easier to evaluate and reach. As long as there are enough equipment and
investment, capacity could be built in a short period. This actually happened in RES-e in China. However,
the installation of capacity is just the beginning rather than the end of the RES-e industry. The lower
section of the industrial chain is the market of the upper section. The overlook on the end users,
because of the difficulty to evaluate and control them, finally caused the problem of overproduction.
In the RES-e equipment market, both the suppliers and the consumers were motivated. Developers, as
the equipment consumers, were motivated to invest in RES-e power plants by the administrative policy
and promised profits under FIT. Manufacturers, as the suppliers, were motivated both by the fast
growing demand and the supportive policies. While both the supply and demand sides were motivated,
a new market of RES-e equipment was quickly established.
In the RES-e power market, the developers, as the suppliers, were motivated, while the buyers, the
power grid companies, had not enough incentive to absorb RES-e. Other than the technical limitations,
the lack of demand on the other side of the power grid determined the lack of willingness to purchase
RES-e.
8.2 Organizational barriers
The decision making process of the policy-set in the central government is fragmented. The policies in
the policy-set were set by different department of the government and sometimes could overlap with
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each other. At the same time, different targets between central and local government effected the
implementation of the policy-set.
The NDRC is in general considered to be the most influential department in planning economic growth
of China. However, other departments of the central government are also involved in decision-making
process. In renewable energy industry, the electricity price is decided by the NDRC; the special funds are
decided by ministry of finance (MOF); R&D projects is decided by ministry of science and technology
(MOST); and state electricity regulatory commission (SERC) is namely the regulator. "Decision-making is
fragmented at the central government level." (Lou) The fragmented decision-making process also
caused overlapping. For instance, while supporting local manufacturers of wind turbine, the NDRC set
the 70% localization criterion while the MOF also set the supportive subsidy policy to manufacturers.
The overlapping of supportive policies might over motivated manufacturers and cause the problem of
overproduction.
The local government did not hold the same target as the central government did. Local governments
both practice according to the administration of the central government and yield to their own
economic growth target. Because of the inconsistency between their targets, the local government did
not necessarily behave according to the intension of the policy-set. For instance, the policy to deduct
VAT of the RES-e equipment from the VAT of RES-e power was designed to motivate developers. But
when that policy harmed the income of the local governments. They pushed the developers harder to
attract local manufacturer, which both increased burden of developers and caused overproduction.
The fragmentation at the central level and inconsistency between central and local level are the
organizational barriers of RES-e development.
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8.3 The monopoly of power grid
The monopoly of power grid eliminated competition in the transmission, distribution and retail section.
Market measures were not available in these sections to support RES-e development. The size of SGCC is
huge. In 2012, the company generated a profit of more than CNY 200 billion with a profit margin of less
3%. Any of the national department alone could hardly influence SGCC much. (Xu, Yifan)
RES-e development was not attractive to SGCC. At a micro level, the connected capacity of RES-e would
affect that of conventional electricity. As the generation of RES-e plant was in general less productive
than conventional plant, the power grid would get less income by connecting more RES-e. At the macro
level, the demand of distributed power plant or self-sustain micro grid would harm the influence and
income of the power grid.
At the same time, the power grid company also mostly monopolizes power grid technologies. The
barriers and solutions were all claimed and dominated by the power grid company.
The power grid company has been arguing high voltage remote transmission system as one of the
solution of RES-e absorption. However, some industry experts also questioned that the SGCC might use
the system more on conventional electricity transmission than on RES-e. There were examples that the
grid company used RES-e to construct new transmission capacity but reject RES-e by technical excuses
after construction. (Xu, Yifan)
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9 Potential and opportunity
9.1 Funding of renewable energy
The funding of renewable energy is a critical problem. Under the current FIT model, all the consumers
are supposed to share the cost of RES-e. However, the price of electric power was sensitive in China. To
industry, a rise in electricity price might harm economic growth. To low income householders, an
increase in electricity price might also cause social problems. If a nationwide increase of electricity price
is not an option, two solutions could be considered to solve the funding problem. One is fiscal channel
and the other is RPS model.
The fiscal channel solution is to support RES-e by the government fiscal budget. The income of the fiscal
channel is taxation on electricity consumption or carbon emission. By doing that, government could
collect taxes mostly from energy intensive industries, which should take more responsibility in emission
reduction.
The real RPS model is different from the RPS model on installed capacity, which was used in China at the
very beginning of the discussed time period. By requiring a quota of RES-e generation or consumption,
RPS model would form a market of certified emission reduction credits (CERs). The RPS model would
fund RES-e within the CERs market it created and sustain the ecosystem.
9.2 Liberalization of power sector
The separation of distribution and retail section of the power grid would help leverage market measures
to support RES-e. Take the Shanghai Green Electricity Scheme for example. If the retail of RES-e was a.
free market, several retailers of RES-e could compete under a market framework. Each of them would
have better motivation to promote RES-e for their own sake.
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9.3 Distributed RES-e
Distributed RES-e is a good method to involve more consumers into the promotion of RES-e. As showed
in the Beijing householder case, normal citizens as well as factories have willingness to participate in
RES-e development if they are properly motivated. Self-sustained RES-e would be more appropriate to
promote RES-e consumption.
One important consideration to promote self-sustained RES-e is the pricing. If the price of distributed
RES-e were the same as FIT, generators would prefer to sell all of their production to the power grid as
the FIT is even higher than the electricity price of normal users. More economic benefit could be
captured if they sell the electricity rather than consume it. At the same time, the RES-e price for
distributed RES-e should also be high enough to support a reasonable IRR.
A good consideration is to price the distributed RES-e at a lower price and subsidize on generation.
Because the normal consumption price of electricity is higher than the sales price, more benefits will be
captured if the generators use the RES-e themselves.
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10 Conclusion
Under the renewable policies of China, the manufacturing of renewable power equipment and the
generation of RES-e grew rapidly. However, the power grid company, the consumers lacked incentives
to sustain a local demand of RES-e. When focused on the supply side, policies could build up capacity
shortly but could not make an industry sustainable. This conclusion is found in the study of RES-e
policies in China. This conclusion is also valid in the manufacturing industry of renewable power
equipment. Wind turbine manufacturers survive better than solar PV manufacturers, because the
policies motivated local wind farm developers, who created a stable local demand.
Focusing on GDP growth in the past decades, China's government tended to design its economic growth
policies on the supply side to build up capacity quickly. However, as the economic scale of China
becomes significant, international market could no longer absorb the entire capacity growth in China,
especially during economic decline. Facing sustainability issues as in the RES-e industry, China's
government should shift its new policies focus on the local demand side and increase its domestic
consumption.
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12 Appendix
Appendix 1 Major renewable energy regulation timeline in China, source: GlobalData, REEEP
Year Organization Policy Key Points
2005 National Renewable The NPC passed the law in 2005 for its implementation in 2006.
People's Energy Law
Congress
(NPC)
National Renewable The list details 88 renewable energy areas (including 35 PV
Development energy areas) subject to support.
industry
and Reform
development
Commission instruction list
2006 National Provisional The document covers how to calculate FITs for renewable energy
Development administrative and the FIT system.
measures on
and Reform pricing and
Commission cost sharing
for renewable
energy power
generation
National Administrative The document specifies the scope of management responsibility
Development provisions for for the central and local governments, the scope of responsibility
renewable for central government organizations, and the responsibilities and
and Reform energy power obligations of electric power generation and transmission
Commission generation companies.
Ministry of Provisional The document specifies the scope for support from the
Finance administrative Renewable Energy Development Fund and explains the
measures on procedures for applications for financial support and their
the acceptance. It also clarifies financial support methods and the
Renewable scope of their applications and specifies the responsibility for
Energy monitoring and reporting uses of the fund.
Development
Fund
Ministry of Provisional The document specifies how local government regulatory
Finance and administrative organizations should consider applications for subsidies for
measures on projects to use renewable energy in buildings and how they
Ministry of the fund for should appropriate those subsidies.
Construction renewable
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energy
applications
for buildings
Ministry of Instructions The document specifies how local government regulatory
Finance and on organizations should deliberate pilot projects. Approved projects
Ministry of deliberation will be announced annually.
process of
Construction pilot projects
for renewable
energy
applications
for buildings
Ministry of Renewable The plan promotes international cooperation in research on
Science and energy and renewable energy and new energy priorities.
2007 new energy
Technology, international
National cooperation
Development plan
and
Reform
Commission
National Temporary The document provides for how electric power transmission
Development Measures of companies should collect and use renewable energy surcharges.
and Reform Regulation on
Renewable
Commission
Energy
Surcharge
National Medium to The plan sets renewable energy development goals for 2010 and
Development Long-term 2020.
and Reform Renewable
Energy
Commission
Development
Plan
2008 National 11th Five- Based on the Medium to Long-term Renewable Energy
Development Year Development Plan, the document sets renewable energy
Development development goals (including modified ones) for 2010 and
and Reform Plan for provides for specific action plans.
Commission RenewableEnergy
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2009 National Revision of The revised law was passed on December 26, 2009.
People's the
Renewable
Congress
Energy Law
2011 National The Twelfth The plan incorporates specific deployment targets for renewable
People's five-year plan energy
Congress
and National
Development
and Reform
Commission
